Tenable NIST 800-171 Compliance: What Tenable Proves and What It Can't
By The Defense Compliance Report Editorial Team — an independent trade publication on CMMC 2.0 and DIB compliance · Last verified September 2026
Tenable NIST 800-171 compliance has a short answer: Tenable can't make you compliant, and no scanner can. Its scans and configuration checks can support vulnerability management and selected technical safeguards. They cannot establish all 110 Revision 2 requirements. The evidence map below shows what to collect, what each artifact leaves unproved, and who still has work to do. Tenable documentation; NIST assessment objectives.
NIST SP 800-171 Revision 2 is the National Institute of Standards and Technology's special publication containing 110 security requirements for protecting Controlled Unclassified Information (CUI). Below, you'll find all 110 organized into an evidence plan, with each requirement's deduction weight in the Department of Defense (DoD) scoring method. There's also a worked example of a "green" Tenable report card that still leaves six machines without proof. Revision 2; DoD assessment methodology.
Status, checked September 23, 2026. The Department of War — the name used on the Department's current official sites — suspended Cybersecurity Maturity Model Certification (CMMC) Phase II on July 13, 2026. Its CMMC page says the program remains in Phase 1, with procurement requirements limited to Level 1 and Level 2 self-assessments during the review. The Department continues enforcing NIST SP 800-171 Revision 2 through self-assessments and select government-led assessments. Class Deviation 2026-O0025, Revision 3, dated September 3, 2026 retains that direction. We found no published Reform Task Force outcome or replacement Phase II date on the official CMMC pages and deviation index checked. A review deadline is not a restart date. Your own evidence — including what Tenable produces — still stands behind your assessment. See what the suspension changed
This page is for you if both are true:
- Your covered contractor systems must protect covered defense information under DFARS 252.204-7012, or your contract requires CMMC Level 2. DFARS means Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement. For covered systems not operated on behalf of the government, the current deviation specifies NIST SP 800-171 Revision 2; the mere presence of the clause does not make every company system part of the assessment. Current deviation, clause 252.204-7012(b).
- You run Tenable, you're pricing it, or your managed service provider (MSP) runs it for you.
It's not the right page if:
- You only handle Federal Contract Information (FCI) under a Level 1 requirement. Level 1's 15 safeguards do include finding and fixing system flaws, and a scanner can help with that (32 CFR 170.15). But you don't need a 110-row evidence map. Start with the Level 1 self-assessment checklist.
- You want the scanning rules for any tool, not Tenable specifically. Read vulnerability scanning for CMMC.
Not sure which you are? No web page — including this one — sets your CMMC level. Your contract does. Check the stated level and assessment type in the solicitation, contract, and applicable flow-down, plus any written amendment or modification. DFARS 252.204-7012 alone does not specify a CMMC level. If older language still requires a suspended assessment type, ask the contracting party to resolve it in writing; do not treat a news announcement as your contract modification. Then check whether you actually hold CUI with our FCI vs. CUI guide. July 13 implementation memorandum; September 3 deviation.
What can Tenable prove for NIST 800-171 compliance?
Tenable's scans and configuration audits produce direct technical evidence for four core workflows in this guide:
- scanning for vulnerabilities (3.11.2)
- fixing vulnerabilities based on risk (3.11.3)
- finding and fixing system flaws on time (3.14.1)
- enforcing security settings (3.4.2)
The next table adds 31 selected examples of supporting evidence. The remaining 75 requirements have their own evidence plans later on the page. These are counts of the examples in this guide, not a claim that Tenable can help with exactly 35 requirements or none of the others. A product's full capabilities depend on the edition, integrations, target systems, and checks actually run.
Here's the part vendor pages don't lead with: no scanner can tell you you're compliant. Tenable's own Nessus documentation says so. It notes that a lack of vulnerabilities doesn't mean a server is configured correctly or "compliant."
That's not a knock on the tool. It's the job description. A scanner checks machines. CMMC checks the safeguards within your assessment scope — machines, people, paperwork, and buildings (32 CFR 170.19).
| How this guide organizes the evidence | Requirements | Maximum deductions | What it means |
|---|---|---|---|
| Core evidence workflows | 4 | 16 | Tenable's results support the technical work. You still write the rules, enforce settings, and do the fixing. |
| Selected supporting examples | 31 | 97 | A scan or audit can test a setting or list software. Other evidence must complete the answer. |
| Other requirements to plan for | 75 | 200 | Use the separate evidence plans below; this is not a finding that Tenable output could never help. |
| All requirements | 110 | 313 | Maximum deductions, not points earned. The system security plan (SSP) is a prerequisite, not a zero-point pass. |
“Maximum deductions” adds the largest deduction assigned to each requirement by the NIST SP 800-171 DoD Assessment Methodology, v1.2.1, Annex A. The current CMMC scoring rules are in 32 CFR 170.24. A completed assessment can run from 110 down to −203. Most scored requirements deduct 1, 3, or 5 points when not met; 3.5.3 and 3.13.11 have specific 3-point partial-implementation cases instead of the full 5-point deduction. An absent or inadequate system security plan prevents completion of the assessment; it is not a 0-point item. These aren't points Tenable earns you, and this table isn't a score.
How we sorted them. We compared the Revision 2 requirements and NIST SP 800-171A assessment objectives with Tenable’s documented scans, configuration checks, and exports. The first two groups identify concrete evidence examples; the last group keeps every remaining requirement in the work plan. “Other” means no example is mapped here, not no product capability exists. Each linked check proves only the setting or condition it actually tests.
This is our classification, not Tenable's and not the government's. Every row is below, so you can disagree with any one of them.
The four core evidence workflows
Tenable supplies direct technical evidence for scanning, patch tracking, and security settings. Three of these four requirements carry a 5-point deduction. They cannot be deferred on a CMMC assessment Plan of Action and Milestones (POA&M), the limited fix-it list allowed for a Conditional status. In general, requirements worth more than 1 point cannot go on that list; 3.13.11 has one narrow encryption exception. You can record an unmet requirement in an honest assessment, but these three must be met for an eligible Conditional or Final Level 2 status. 32 CFR 170.21(a)(2).
| Requirement | Deduction / assessment POA&M? | What Tenable can show | What you still supply | Usual owner |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 3.11.2 Scan systems and applications periodically and when new vulnerabilities affecting them are identified | 5 / No | Scan schedules; dated results for covered systems and applications; whether the intended checks actually executed. Scan-information example | A defined frequency no longer than one year; reconciled coverage of the applicable systems and applications; records of scans triggered by relevant new vulnerabilities | Security or IT lead |
| 3.11.3 Fix vulnerabilities based on risk | 1 / Yes, if you meet the rule's other conditions | Findings with severity; later scans showing what closed. Remediation-tracking documentation | Your risk decisions, corrective work, tickets, and follow-up verification; a risk-acceptance record alone does not waive an unmet requirement | Whoever patches |
| 3.14.1 Find, report, and fix system flaws on time | 5 / No | Dated flaw findings and follow-up scans. Vulnerability-tracking documentation | Your written time frames, and the patching itself | IT operations |
| 3.4.2 Set and enforce security configuration settings | 5 / No | Configuration-audit results showing the benchmark, the expected value, and the value found on each machine. Export fields | A written decision that this benchmark is your baseline, your approved exceptions, and how you enforce it | System administrator |
A 1-point item like 3.11.3 can go on an assessment POA&M only if the score is at least 88 of 110 and all other conditions are met. The rule excludes 3.1.20, 3.1.22, 3.12.4, 3.10.3, 3.10.4, and 3.10.5 regardless of weight; 3.12.4 is the system security plan (SSP). Eligible remaining items must close within 180 days of the Conditional CMMC Status Date. 32 CFR 170.21(a)(2).
31 examples where Tenable can back up part of the answer
These depend on which checks you actually run. A configuration audit tests a setting only if the audit file you chose includes a check for it. Remote Nessus compliance checks need the appropriate working credentials; a supported local agent scan uses the agent’s execution context instead. Read every row below as: “Tenable can help prove this technical part — if the selected check applies and successfully ran.” The remaining-evidence column gives examples, not every assessment objective. Nessus compliance documentation; agent-scan documentation.
In the table:
- SSH (Secure Shell) and TLS (Transport Layer Security) are encryption protocols.
- EDR means endpoint detection and response.
- FIPS means Federal Information Processing Standards.
| Req. | In plain words | Deduction if not met | What a Tenable scan or audit can show | What else you need |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 3.1.5 | Least privilege, including admin accounts | 3 | Selected user-rights settings, such as which accounts may debug programs. Example source | A privilege policy and access reviews |
| 3.1.7 | Stop non-admins from running admin functions, and log it | 1 | Selected administrative-event logging settings, such as authorization-policy changes. Example source | Controls preventing non-admin use of privileged functions, and actual logging of those functions |
| 3.1.8 | Limit failed logon attempts | 1 | Account lockout settings. Example source | A policy stating the limit; cloud and app accounts the scan can't see |
| 3.1.9 | Show privacy and security notices | 1 | Logon banner settings. Example source | Banner text your organization approved |
| 3.1.10 | Lock idle sessions and conceal previously visible information | 1 | Screen-lock and inactivity settings. Example source | The defined inactivity period, pattern-hiding display, and successful reauthentication behavior |
| 3.1.11 | End sessions automatically | 1 | Session time-limit settings. Example source | The conditions written in policy |
| 3.1.13 | Encrypt remote access sessions | 5 | Findings on weak or unencrypted SSH, TLS, or remote desktop settings. Example source | Your remote-access design; validated encryption (see 3.13.11) |
| 3.3.1 | Create and keep audit logs | 5 | Selected audit-policy settings on tested systems. Example source | Actual records with the needed event detail, sufficient retention, and coverage beyond those checks |
| 3.3.7 | Sync clocks to a trusted source | 1 | Time-source settings. Example source | Your network time design |
| 3.3.8 | Protect logs and logging tools | 1 | Log-file permission checks, mainly on Linux and Unix. Example source | Protection against unauthorized access, modification, and deletion across audit information and tools |
| 3.3.9 | Limit who manages logging | 1 | The "manage auditing" user right. Example source | A list of who holds it and why |
| 3.4.1 | Keep baselines and inventories | 5 | Discovered assets and installed-software observations, subject to inventory reconciliation. Example source | Documented baselines; an inventory that includes anything the scanner missed |
| 3.4.6 | Run only essential functions | 5 | Service-configuration checks, such as whether Print Spooler is disabled on a system where it is not needed. Example source | Your written definition of "essential" |
| 3.4.7 | Block nonessential programs, ports, protocols, and services | 5 | Open ports the scan finds; compare them with approved functions and services. Example source | An approved list of allowed ports and services |
| 3.4.8 | Allow-list or block-list software | 5 | Installed-software observations you can compare against an approved allow-list or block-list. Example source | The tool that actually blocks software, and the list itself |
| 3.4.9 | Control user-installed software | 1 | Changes between retained software inventories or available product history. Example source | An install policy and controls |
| 3.5.7 | Enforce password complexity | 1 | Password-policy settings. Example source | App and cloud accounts outside scan reach |
| 3.5.8 | Block password reuse for a set number of generations | 1 | Password-history setting. Example source | App and cloud accounts outside scan reach |
| 3.5.10 | Store and send only protected passwords | 5 | Selected settings such as disabling reversible password storage. Example source | Protection of stored and transmitted passwords across all relevant applications and services |
| 3.8.7 | Control removable media | 5 | USB-storage module settings on a supported Linux host. Example check | Your removable-media policy, permitted uses, enforcement, and coverage of other devices |
| 3.11.1 | Assess risk periodically | 3 | Scan results as one input. Example source | The risk assessment itself |
| 3.12.1 | Periodically assess whether controls work | 5 | Scan and audit results for technical controls. Example source | An assessment covering every applicable objective, including technical objectives not established by the report |
| 3.12.3 | Monitor controls on an ongoing basis | 5 | Recurring scan and audit results. Example source | Monitoring of everything a scan can't see |
| 3.13.8 | Protect CUI in transit with encryption or the permitted alternative physical safeguards | 3 | Supported-protocol observations and findings on weak or clear-text services. Example source | Actual CUI data flows and implementation of encryption or justified alternative physical safeguards |
| 3.13.9 | End network connections at session end or after defined inactivity | 1 | Selected network timeout settings, such as SSH connection checks. Example source | Actual termination behavior and coverage of other connections; a network keepalive is not the same as a user-idle timer |
| 3.13.11 | Use FIPS-validated encryption for CUI | 3–5 | Whether a machine's FIPS mode setting is turned on. Example source | The applicable validation for the exact cryptographic module, version, operating environment, and approved mode; a FIPS setting alone does not establish that |
| 3.13.15 | Protect session authenticity | 5 | Certificate and protocol findings. Example source | Design evidence |
| 3.13.16 | Protect CUI at rest | 1 | Selected encryption-policy settings, such as blocking writes to unencrypted removable drives. Example source | Actual confidentiality protection everywhere CUI rests; an encryption policy alone does not prove every drive is encrypted |
| 3.14.2 | Protect against malicious code | 5 | Observed antivirus presence and state on supported systems. Example source | Implemented protection at the appropriate locations, with coverage and operating evidence |
| 3.14.3 | Watch security alerts and advisories, and act on them | 5 | Scan dates and plugin-feed versions, paired with findings relevant to an advisory. Example source | Your review of relevant alerts and advisories, applicability decisions, and action; a vendor feed update alone proves none of those |
| 3.14.4 | Keep malware protection updated | 5 | Findings on out-of-date antivirus definitions. Example source | Update records from your antivirus or EDR |
In these 35 mapped examples, 21 requirements carry a maximum deduction of 3 or 5 points. Of those 21, only 3.13.11 has the narrow assessment-POA&M exception: encryption is employed to protect CUI, but it is not FIPS-validated, producing the specified 3-point deduction. A failed encryption requirement is not automatically eligible. 32 CFR 170.21(a)(2); 32 CFR 170.24.
The links above show vendor-documented examples, not an official Tenable-to-NIST crosswalk. A benchmark’s numerical settings are not automatically CMMC requirements. Inventory observations also need checking: Tenable notes that its Windows software-enumeration plugin can still see registry entries left after an uninstall. Plugin 20811.
110-requirement evidence map
What the Tenable evidence map does — and does not — tell you
These are evidence plans, not findings. They do not calculate a score, coverage percentage, MET/NOT MET/N/A result, product rating, or compliance determination.
Maximum-weight arithmetic only: 16 + 97 + 200 = 313. The supporting range is 95–97; the SSP row remains a separate prerequisite; it is not a zero-point or compliant result.
Rows by NIST family
| Family | Core | Supporting | Other |
|---|---|---|---|
| 3.1 | 0 | 7 | 15 |
| 3.2 | 0 | 0 | 3 |
| 3.3 | 0 | 4 | 5 |
| 3.4 | 1 | 5 | 3 |
| 3.5 | 0 | 3 | 8 |
| 3.6 | 0 | 0 | 3 |
| 3.7 | 0 | 0 | 6 |
| 3.8 | 0 | 1 | 8 |
| 3.9 | 0 | 0 | 2 |
| 3.10 | 0 | 0 | 6 |
| 3.11 | 2 | 1 | 0 |
| 3.12 | 0 | 2 | 2 |
| 3.13 | 0 | 5 | 11 |
| 3.14 | 1 | 3 | 3 |
| Requirement | Deduction / assessment POA&M? | What Tenable can show | What you still supply | Usual owner |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 3.4.2 Establish and enforce security configuration settings | 5 | Configuration-audit results showing the benchmark, the expected value, and the value found on each machine. Export fields | A written decision that this benchmark is your baseline, your approved exceptions, and how you enforce it | System administrator |
| 3.11.2 Scan systems and applications periodically and for relevant new vulnerabilities | 5 | Scan schedules; dated results for covered systems and applications; whether the intended checks actually executed. Scan-information example | A defined frequency no longer than one year; reconciled coverage of the applicable systems and applications; records of scans triggered by relevant new vulnerabilities | Security or IT lead |
| 3.11.3 Remediate vulnerabilities according to risk assessments | 1 | Findings with severity; later scans showing what closed. Remediation-tracking documentation | Your risk decisions, corrective work, tickets, and follow-up verification; a risk-acceptance record alone does not waive an unmet requirement | Whoever patches |
| 3.14.1 Identify, report, and correct system flaws in a timely manner | 5 | Dated flaw findings and follow-up scans. Vulnerability-tracking documentation | Your written time frames, and the patching itself | IT operations |
31 examples where Tenable can back up part of the answer
| Req. | In plain words | Deduction if not met | What a Tenable scan or audit can show | What else you need |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 3.1.5 | Apply least privilege, including privileged accounts | 3 | Selected user-rights settings, such as which accounts may debug programs. Example source | A privilege policy and access reviews |
| 3.1.7 | Prevent unauthorized privileged functions and log their execution | 1 | Selected administrative-event logging settings, such as authorization-policy changes. Example source | Controls preventing non-admin use of privileged functions, and actual logging of those functions |
| 3.1.8 | Limit unsuccessful logon attempts | 1 | Account lockout settings. Example source | A policy stating the limit; cloud and app accounts the scan can't see |
| 3.1.9 | Provide privacy and security notices consistent with applicable CUI rules | 1 | Logon banner settings. Example source | Banner text your organization approved |
| 3.1.10 | Lock inactive sessions and conceal displayed information | 1 | Screen-lock and inactivity settings. Example source | The defined inactivity period, pattern-hiding display, and successful reauthentication behavior |
| 3.1.11 | Automatically terminate user sessions under defined conditions | 1 | Session time-limit settings. Example source | The conditions written in policy |
| 3.1.13 | Protect remote-access confidentiality cryptographically | 5 | Findings on weak or unencrypted SSH, TLS, or remote desktop settings. Example source | Your remote-access design; validated encryption (see 3.13.11) |
| 3.3.1 | Create and retain audit records needed to investigate activity | 5 | Selected audit-policy settings on tested systems. Example source | Actual records with the needed event detail, sufficient retention, and coverage beyond those checks |
| 3.3.7 | Synchronize internal clocks with an authoritative source | 1 | Time-source settings. Example source | Your network time design |
| 3.3.8 | Protect audit information and tools | 1 | Log-file permission checks, mainly on Linux and Unix. Example source | Protection against unauthorized access, modification, and deletion across audit information and tools |
| 3.3.9 | Limit audit-management functions to authorized privileged users | 1 | The "manage auditing" user right. Example source | A list of who holds it and why |
| 3.4.1 | Maintain system baselines and inventories throughout the life cycle | 5 | Discovered assets and installed-software observations, subject to inventory reconciliation. Example source | Documented baselines; an inventory that includes anything the scanner missed |
| 3.4.6 | Provide only essential system capabilities | 5 | Service-configuration checks, such as whether Print Spooler is disabled on a system where it is not needed. Example source | Your written definition of "essential" |
| 3.4.7 | Restrict nonessential programs, functions, ports, protocols, and services | 5 | Open ports the scan finds; compare them with approved functions and services. Example source | An approved list of allowed ports and services |
| 3.4.8 | Use software allow-listing or block-listing | 5 | Installed-software observations you can compare against an approved allow-list or block-list. Example source | The tool that actually blocks software, and the list itself |
| 3.4.9 | Control and monitor user-installed software | 1 | Changes between retained software inventories or available product history. Example source | An install policy and controls |
| 3.5.7 | Enforce password complexity and changes of characters | 1 | Password-policy settings. Example source | App and cloud accounts outside scan reach |
| 3.5.8 | Prevent password reuse for the defined generations | 1 | Password-history setting. Example source | App and cloud accounts outside scan reach |
| 3.5.10 | Store and transmit only cryptographically protected passwords | 5 | Selected settings such as disabling reversible password storage. Example source | Protection of stored and transmitted passwords across all relevant applications and services |
| 3.8.7 | Control removable-media use | 5 | USB-storage module settings on a supported Linux host. Example check | Your removable-media policy, permitted uses, enforcement, and coverage of other devices |
| 3.11.1 | Assess risk periodically | 3 | Scan results as one input. Example source | The risk assessment itself |
| 3.12.1 | Periodically assess security-control effectiveness | 5 | Scan and audit results for technical controls. Example source | An assessment covering every applicable objective, including technical objectives not established by the report |
| 3.12.3 | Monitor security controls on an ongoing basis | 5 | Recurring scan and audit results. Example source | Monitoring of everything a scan can't see |
| 3.13.8 | Protect CUI in transit cryptographically unless alternative physical safeguards apply | 3 | Supported-protocol observations and findings on weak or clear-text services. Example source | Actual CUI data flows and implementation of encryption or justified alternative physical safeguards |
| 3.13.9 | Terminate network connections at session end or after defined inactivity | 1 | Selected network timeout settings, such as SSH connection checks. Example source | Actual termination behavior and coverage of other connections; a network keepalive is not the same as a user-idle timer |
| 3.13.11 | Use FIPS-validated cryptography when protecting CUI confidentiality | 3–5 | Whether a machine's FIPS mode setting is turned on. Example source | The applicable validation for the exact cryptographic module, version, operating environment, and approved mode; a FIPS setting alone does not establish that |
| 3.13.15 | Protect communications-session authenticity | 5 | Certificate and protocol findings. Example source | Design evidence |
| 3.13.16 | Protect CUI confidentiality at rest | 1 | Selected encryption-policy settings, such as blocking writes to unencrypted removable drives. Example source | Actual confidentiality protection everywhere CUI rests; an encryption policy alone does not prove every drive is encrypted |
| 3.14.2 | Provide malicious-code protection at appropriate locations | 5 | Observed antivirus presence and state on supported systems. Example source | Implemented protection at the appropriate locations, with coverage and operating evidence |
| 3.14.3 | Monitor security alerts and advisories and act on them | 5 | Scan dates and plugin-feed versions, paired with findings relevant to an advisory. Example source | Your review of relevant alerts and advisories, applicability decisions, and action; a vendor feed update alone proves none of those |
| 3.14.4 | Update malicious-code protection when new releases are available | 5 | Findings on out-of-date antivirus definitions. Example source | Update records from your antivirus or EDR |
No supporting examples from this family are mapped in this table. See the other-requirement evidence plans.
Other requirements by work group
| Work group | Rows | Maximum deductions |
|---|---|---|
| Access and identity | 13 | 33 |
| Remote, wireless, mobile, and external systems | 10 | 28 |
| People | 5 | 19 |
| Logging and monitoring | 7 | 19 |
| Change control | 3 | 7 |
| Incident response | 3 | 11 |
| Maintenance | 6 | 18 |
| Media | 8 | 18 |
| Physical | 6 | 14 |
| Plans and the SSP | 2 | 3 |
| Network design and boundary | 11 | 27 |
| Malware scanning | 1 | 3 |
See the individual weights for the other 75 requirements
These short descriptions are a navigation aid, not the full requirement or its assessment objectives. “Other” means not mapped to an example in this guide; it does not mean Tenable could never supply supporting evidence.
Requirements: NIST SP 800-171 Revision 2. Objectives: NIST SP 800-171A, June 2018. Deduction weights: DoD Assessment Methodology, Annex A and 32 CFR 170.24. Checked September 23, 2026.
| Requirement | Work that still needs an evidence plan | Deduction if not met | Usually handled by |
|---|---|---|---|
| 3.1.1 | Limit system access to authorized users, processes, and devices | 5 | Your identity system and MSP; multifactor authentication |
| 3.1.2 | Limit users to authorized transactions and functions | 5 | Your identity system and MSP; multifactor authentication |
| 3.1.3 | Control CUI flows according to approved authorizations | 1 | Your identity system and MSP; multifactor authentication |
| 3.1.4 | Separate duties to reduce misuse without collusion | 1 | Your identity system and MSP; multifactor authentication |
| 3.1.6 | Use nonprivileged accounts for nonsecurity functions | 1 | Your identity system and MSP; multifactor authentication |
| 3.1.12 | Monitor and control remote-access sessions | 5 | MSP; mobile device management |
| 3.1.14 | Route remote access through managed access points | 1 | MSP; mobile device management |
| 3.1.15 | Authorize remote privileged commands and access to security-relevant information | 1 | MSP; mobile device management |
| 3.1.16 | Authorize wireless access before allowing connections | 5 | MSP; mobile device management |
| 3.1.17 | Protect wireless access with authentication and encryption | 5 | MSP; mobile device management |
| 3.1.18 | Control mobile-device connections | 5 | MSP; mobile device management |
| 3.1.19 | Encrypt CUI on mobile devices and mobile computing platforms | 3 | MSP; mobile device management |
| 3.1.20 | Verify and control external-system connections and use | 1 | MSP; mobile device management |
| 3.1.21 | Limit organizational portable-storage use on external systems | 1 | MSP; mobile device management |
| 3.1.22 | Control CUI on publicly accessible systems | 1 | MSP; mobile device management |
| 3.2.1 | Make managers, administrators, and users aware of security risks and policies | 5 | HR and training |
| 3.2.2 | Train personnel for their assigned security duties | 5 | HR and training |
| 3.2.3 | Train personnel to recognize and report possible insider threats | 1 | HR and training |
| 3.3.2 | Trace system actions uniquely to individual users | 3 | Security information and event management (SIEM), managed detection and response (MDR), or an MSSP |
| 3.3.3 | Review and update logged events | 1 | Security information and event management (SIEM), managed detection and response (MDR), or an MSSP |
| 3.3.4 | Alert on audit-logging failures | 1 | Security information and event management (SIEM), managed detection and response (MDR), or an MSSP |
| 3.3.5 | Correlate audit-review, analysis, and reporting processes | 5 | Security information and event management (SIEM), managed detection and response (MDR), or an MSSP |
| 3.3.6 | Provide audit reduction and report generation | 1 | Security information and event management (SIEM), managed detection and response (MDR), or an MSSP |
| 3.4.3 | Track, review, approve or disapprove, and log system changes | 1 | Your change process |
| 3.4.4 | Analyze security impacts before implementing changes | 1 | Your change process |
| 3.4.5 | Define and enforce access restrictions for system changes | 5 | Your change process |
| 3.5.1 | Identify users, processes, and devices | 5 | Your identity system and MSP; multifactor authentication |
| 3.5.2 | Authenticate identities before allowing access | 5 | Your identity system and MSP; multifactor authentication |
| 3.5.3 | Use multifactor authentication for the required privileged and nonprivileged access | 3–5 | Your identity system and MSP; multifactor authentication |
| 3.5.4 | Use replay-resistant network authentication | 1 | Your identity system and MSP; multifactor authentication |
| 3.5.5 | Prevent identifier reuse for the defined period | 1 | Your identity system and MSP; multifactor authentication |
| 3.5.6 | Disable identifiers after defined inactivity | 1 | Your identity system and MSP; multifactor authentication |
| 3.5.9 | Require an immediate permanent-password change after a temporary password | 1 | Your identity system and MSP; multifactor authentication |
| 3.5.11 | Obscure authentication feedback | 1 | Your identity system and MSP; multifactor authentication |
| 3.6.1 | Establish incident handling covering preparation through recovery | 5 | Your plan, often with an MSSP |
| 3.6.2 | Track, document, and report incidents to designated officials or authorities | 5 | Your plan, often with an MSSP |
| 3.6.3 | Test the incident-response capability | 1 | Your plan, often with an MSSP |
| 3.7.1 | Perform system maintenance | 3 | IT procedures and your MSP |
| 3.7.2 | Control maintenance tools, techniques, mechanisms, and personnel | 5 | IT procedures and your MSP |
| 3.7.3 | Remove CUI from equipment before off-site maintenance | 1 | IT procedures and your MSP |
| 3.7.4 | Check diagnostic and test media for malicious code | 3 | IT procedures and your MSP |
| 3.7.5 | Use multifactor authentication for nonlocal maintenance and terminate connections afterward | 5 | IT procedures and your MSP |
| 3.7.6 | Supervise maintenance personnel without required authorization | 1 | IT procedures and your MSP |
| 3.8.1 | Physically control and securely store media containing CUI | 3 | Procedures and device controls |
| 3.8.2 | Limit CUI media access to authorized users | 3 | Procedures and device controls |
| 3.8.3 | Sanitize or destroy CUI media before disposal or reuse | 5 | Procedures and device controls |
| 3.8.4 | Mark media with required CUI and distribution markings | 1 | Procedures and device controls |
| 3.8.5 | Control and account for CUI media during transport | 1 | Procedures and device controls |
| 3.8.6 | Protect digital CUI during transport cryptographically unless alternative physical safeguards apply | 1 | Procedures and device controls |
| 3.8.8 | Prohibit portable storage without an identifiable owner | 3 | Procedures and device controls |
| 3.8.9 | Protect backup CUI confidentiality at storage locations | 1 | Procedures and device controls |
| 3.9.1 | Screen individuals before authorizing system access | 3 | HR and training |
| 3.9.2 | Protect systems during and after personnel transfers and terminations | 5 | HR and training |
| 3.10.1 | Limit physical access to authorized individuals | 5 | Facilities |
| 3.10.2 | Protect and monitor facilities and supporting infrastructure | 5 | Facilities |
| 3.10.3 | Escort visitors and monitor their activity | 1 | Facilities |
| 3.10.4 | Maintain physical-access logs | 1 | Facilities |
| 3.10.5 | Control and manage physical-access devices | 1 | Facilities |
| 3.10.6 | Apply CUI safeguards at alternate work sites | 1 | Facilities |
| 3.12.2 | Develop and implement plans to correct deficiencies and vulnerabilities | 3 | GRC platform or RPO/RP |
| 3.12.4 | Develop, document, and periodically update the system security plan | Prerequisite | GRC platform or RPO/RP |
| 3.13.1 | Monitor, control, and protect communications at external and key internal boundaries | 5 | MSP or network engineer |
| 3.13.2 | Use security-supporting architecture, development, and engineering principles | 5 | MSP or network engineer |
| 3.13.3 | Separate user functionality from system-management functionality | 1 | MSP or network engineer |
| 3.13.4 | Prevent unintended information transfer through shared resources | 1 | MSP or network engineer |
| 3.13.5 | Separate public-facing components from internal networks | 5 | MSP or network engineer |
| 3.13.6 | Deny network traffic by default and allow by exception | 5 | MSP or network engineer |
| 3.13.7 | Prevent remote devices from simultaneous unauthorized external connections | 1 | MSP or network engineer |
| 3.13.10 | Establish and manage cryptographic keys | 1 | MSP or network engineer |
| 3.13.12 | Prohibit remote activation of collaborative devices and indicate their use | 1 | MSP or network engineer |
| 3.13.13 | Control and monitor mobile code | 1 | MSP or network engineer |
| 3.13.14 | Control and monitor voice-over-IP technologies | 1 | MSP or network engineer |
| 3.14.5 | Perform periodic malware scans and real-time scans of external files | 3 | Antivirus or EDR |
| 3.14.6 | Monitor systems and traffic for attacks or indicators of attack | 5 | Security information and event management (SIEM), managed detection and response (MDR), or an MSSP |
| 3.14.7 | Identify unauthorized system use | 3 | Security information and event management (SIEM), managed detection and response (MDR), or an MSSP |
Six families where a scanner cannot replace the work
These six families need work beyond a scanner, even when a technical check supports part of an objective:
- awareness and training (3.2)
- incident response (3.6)
- maintenance (3.7)
- media protection (3.8)
- personnel security (3.9)
- physical protection (3.10)
Those families involve people, procedures, facilities, and technical safeguards. A scan result cannot replace the whole process. NIST SP 800-171 Revision 2, sections 3.2 and 3.6–3.10.
Watch for this in Tenable's own reports. Tenable's documented 800-171 families include training, incident response, maintenance, and media protection. Only personnel and physical security are left out. If one of those chapters shows results, open the checks and ask what they actually test. A setting on a laptop can't show that your people were trained.
One concrete example is removable storage. Tenable publishes a USB-storage check that can support the device-control part of 3.8.7. It is included in the supporting table. It does not establish your permitted uses, handling procedures, or controls on devices the audit did not test.
The right CMMC path isn't the same for every contractor. What you need beyond Tenable depends on your required CMMC level, whether you handle FCI or CUI, your assessment type, your cloud and IT environment, and your contract timeline. It might be an MSP or MSSP (managed security service provider) to run scans and patching. It might be a GRC (governance, risk, and compliance) platform to hold your SSP and POA&M, or an RPO/RP (Registered Practitioner Organization or Registered Practitioner) to check your evidence. Or it might be a CUI enclave that reduces scope when the CUI environment is genuinely separated; connected endpoints and security services may still remain in scope. The contract clause sets your level, not a checklist. Because a general answer can't resolve those for you, use The Defense Compliance Report's Find My CMMC Path tool to map your situation to the right kind of help before you request quotes — and do not submit CUI, drawings, or sensitive contract details.
Why isn't a green Tenable 800-171 report a passing score?
Tenable’s configuration-audit framework views sort results into NIST families using reference tags on each check. A CMMC assessment works differently. Each requirement is met only when every applicable assessment objective is satisfied, using evidence in final form (32 CFR 170.24(b)). A high pass rate in Tenable can sit right next to a requirement you’d fail. The same rule has specific provisions for documented enduring exceptions and appropriately managed temporary deficiencies; a red check is not, by itself, the final assessment determination.
Where Tenable's 800-171 content lives
| Product | 800-171 content Tenable documents | What it is built from | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Tenable Vulnerability Management (formerly Tenable.io) | "800-171 Audit Summary (Explore)" dashboard and "800-171 Audit Details (Explore)" report. Tenable lists Vulnerability Management as the requirement. | Audit results filtered by the "Compliance Framework" field | |
| Tenable Security Center (formerly Tenable.sc) | "NIST SP 800-171" report template, plus older dashboards and report cards in its feed | Results filtered by "Cross References," such as `800-171\ | 3.11.*` |
| Tenable Nessus Professional | Compliance scans using audit files, plus raw result exports | Plan on building your evidence from scan results and exports |
Here's how the tags work, according to Tenable's documentation:
- In Vulnerability Management, the Compliance Framework filter reads each finding's reference information.
- In Security Center, you filter on cross-references like
800-171|3.11.*for the risk assessment family.
Two things follow from that.
First, these 800-171-filtered views require an 800-171 reference on the check. Not every check has one. On September 23, 2026, we opened a Tenable audit item for a Windows Server 2022 logon banner. It listed NIST SP 800-53 and other references, but no 800-171 reference (example). A missing tag does not make the underlying evidence useless.
Second, one finding can carry several tags. Tenable warns that reference counts in its widgets can differ from the number of actual findings. So an empty chapter means "no tagged results," not "no problems."
How to read each result
| What you see | What to do with it | What not to conclude |
|---|---|---|
| Passed | Keep the expected value, the value found, the machine, and the date | That the requirement is met on every machine, or that its other objectives are met |
| Failed | Confirm it, then fix it or record a risk decision | That every failure carries the same risk or deadline |
| Warning | Read the output. Tenable uses warnings for checks a person must verify and for plugin errors. | That it passed, or that you can drop it |
| Error | Find out why the check couldn't run, then get a valid result | That the requirement doesn't apply |
| No result | Match the machine against your inventory, credentials, and filters | That silence means success |
The four result labels come from Tenable's compliance export documentation. Tenable also posts plugin errors as warnings through plugin 214001 (Nessus docs).
Worked example: a green report card with six machines missing
This example is fictional. The report-card rule is real.
Say you run a 45-person machine shop. Your SSP puts 22 systems in scope:
- two file servers
- 12 desktops
- six laptops
- a firewall
- a networked copier
Your written policy says each of these 22 systems gets a supported authenticated scan every 14 days. For this example, all 22 have been determined to need that coverage; none has a documented exception or an alternative assessment treatment. That's your company's choice, not a federal number.
You use Tenable Security Center's published "NIST SP 800-171: Risk Assessment" report card. Its first check turns green when at least 80% of actively and passively detected systems were scanned in the last 14 days.
Here's what actually happened this cycle:
| Measure | Count or result |
|---|---|
| Systems in your SSP scope | 22 |
| Systems Tenable detected | 20 (one off-site laptop and an unreachable copier are absent from the card's detected-system population) |
| Detected systems scanned in the last 14 days | 16 |
| Report card: 16 ÷ 20 | 80% — green |
| Your real coverage: 16 ÷ 22 | about 73% |
| Systems without the proof your own policy promises | 6 (4 detected but not scanned, 2 never seen) |
The card turned green because it divides by detected systems. The two machines Tenable never saw don't count against it at all.
An assessor reconciles the evidence with the actual assessment scope—not the dashboard’s denominator. In this example, the six gaps leave objective 3.11.2[b] unsupported. If 3.11.2 is determined NOT MET, that is a 5-point deduction and it cannot go on an assessment POA&M. The card also says nothing about application coverage or scans triggered by new vulnerabilities affecting those systems and applications. NIST SP 800-171A, 3.11.2; 32 CFR 170.24.
The first fix is coverage work, not automatically a bigger license:
- Match your 22-system inventory against the scanner's target list.
- Cover the traveling laptop through a supported, licensed Tenable agent deployment or an enforced scan window. Tenable describes agent scanning for devices that come and go; confirm the license and management path before assuming your current purchase includes it.
- Work with the asset owner to establish safe, authorized scanning of the copier, or resolve the asset classification and an applicable documented alternative or exception. Simply writing ‘cannot scan’ does not satisfy the requirement; do not run aggressive scans against fragile equipment to fill a dashboard.
- Re-run the scans and keep the dated results.
Don't lower the threshold to turn the card green.
Two limits on this example:
- It uses a legacy Security Center template. Tenable published it in 2016, last updated it in 2019, and says its thresholds can be customized.
- We didn't run the software. We're showing how the published rule does its math.
Older "CMMC" material to use with care
Some of Tenable's CMMC-labeled material predates today's program. Its Security Center "CMMC Operations Report," published in October 2020, still describes organizations proving compliance at one of five levels starting in June 2020. CMMC now has three levels: 15 requirements at Level 1, 110 at Level 2, and 24 enhanced requirements at Level 3 in addition to the Level 2 foundation (32 CFR 170.4). If you use an older template, verify that its checks and dependencies still fit your deployment; do not reuse its obsolete program language.
What does requirement 3.11.2 ask you to prove?
Requirement 3.11.2 says to scan organizational systems and applications periodically and when new vulnerabilities affecting them are identified. NIST SP 800-171A splits that into five checkable pieces. Every applicable objective must be satisfied; any not-applicable determination needs a documented basis (32 CFR 170.24(b)). "Periodically" has a ceiling: the CMMC rule defines it as a regular interval you choose that can't exceed one year (32 CFR 170.4).
| Objective | What it asks | What Tenable can show | What you supply |
|---|---|---|---|
| [a] | Have you defined how often systems and applications are scanned? | Scan schedules as configured | An approved policy stating the frequency (no more than one year) |
| [b] | Were systems scanned that often? | Dated scan history for each machine | An asset inventory matched to the scanner's target list |
| [c] | Were applications scanned that often? | Applicable application/software findings from supported host, agent, or web-application scanning | An application inventory and testing appropriate to each application, including custom code where needed |
| [d] | Were systems scanned when a new vulnerability affecting them was identified? | Dated scan results using applicable checks | The relevant vulnerability/applicability decision and resulting scan record |
| [e] | Were applications scanned when a new vulnerability affecting them was identified? | Application scan results after the relevant vulnerability was identified | A record tying the relevant vulnerability to the application and resulting testing |
The requirement's own discussion in NIST SP 800-171 Revision 2 fills in three details:
- It says not to overlook networked printers, scanners, and copiers.
- It says custom software may need static, dynamic, or binary analysis. Choose testing for the application rather than assuming a host scan establishes complete coverage.
- It notes that privileged access helps make scanning thorough. In practice, that's the argument for logged-in scans.
What changes what Tenable can prove
The same license can produce strong evidence or almost none. It depends on how the scans are set up. This table shows the settings that matter most.
| If this is true… | …then | Source |
|---|---|---|
| You use Nessus Essentials or Essentials Plus | These editions do not run compliance audits, so they do not produce the configuration-audit artifacts described above | Nessus docs |
| Your remote compliance scan cannot authenticate | The intended credential-dependent checks cannot complete. Supported local-agent scans use a different execution model; verify the actual check status. | Nessus docs; NIST SP 800-171 Rev. 2; Agent documentation |
| Your scan policy has no audit file | Configuration rows have nothing to report | Nessus docs |
| Laptops leave the building | A network-only scan can miss them when they are unreachable. Tenable describes agent scanning for devices that come and go. | Tenable report card |
| You run custom or web applications | Objectives [c] and [e] need appropriate application coverage. A separate web scanner or code-analysis technique may be needed, but no specific product or universal code-review purchase is prescribed here. | NIST SP 800-171 Rev. 2 |
| Some systems were never detected | This legacy report card uses detected systems as its denominator, not your independently reconciled inventory. | Tenable report card |
| You audit against a "gold image" | A saved "known good" value can pass a check the original benchmark would fail, so record that choice and who approved it | Tenable export docs |
Quick check: Open your scan policy. Is an appropriate audit file selected, and did its checks execute successfully through the configured remote credentials or supported local agent? If not, you do not yet have the configuration evidence you intended to collect.
Does Tenable put itself inside your CMMC assessment scope?
Usually, yes—when it provides security functions for your assessed environment. The CMMC rule’s Security Protection Data (SPD) definition includes information about the configuration or vulnerability status of in-scope assets. Scanning infrastructure and external services that handle that SPD must be evaluated within the assessment boundary, even when they do not handle CUI. They are assessed as Security Protection Assets (SPAs) against requirements relevant to their capabilities; this does not place every system at the vendor in your scope. 32 CFR 170.4 and 170.19.
A few more terms are useful here:
- External service provider (ESP): Outside people, technology, or facilities used for IT or cybersecurity services. The CMMC definition covers services that process, store, or transmit your CUI or SPD on provider assets; focus on the relevant service, not the provider’s entire business.
- Cloud service provider (CSP): A provider of cloud computing services under the cloud-service model used in the rule. Owning all of the underlying hardware is not the test.
- FedRAMP (Federal Risk and Authorization Management Program): The federal cloud-security program. Its current Marketplace uses “FedRAMP Certified” labels; those apply to a specific offering, not to a customer’s CMMC status.
The DoD's Level 2 Scoping Guide explains why a scanner lands in scope. It describes SPD as security information that could help an attacker if disclosed.
Think of Tenable as the building inspector's clipboard. The clipboard isn't the building. But if someone steals it, they know every weak door and window. That's why the rule puts it in scope, even though it never touches a drawing.
| Your setup | Where scan results live | What the rules say | What to document |
|---|---|---|---|
| Nessus or Security Center on your own hardware | Your configured infrastructure; check integrations and exports too | A Security Protection Asset: in scope, and assessed against the requirements that fit what it does | Asset inventory, SSP entry, network diagram, and hardening of the scanner itself |
| Tenable's commercial cloud | Tenable's cloud | A cloud provider holding SPD but no CUI doesn't have to meet the FedRAMP requirement in DFARS 252.204-7012. Its services are still in your scope. | SSP entry, plus the provider's service description and customer responsibility matrix (CRM). Ask Tenable for its CRM. |
| Tenable's FedRAMP offering | Tenable's FedRAMP-certified environment | If an external cloud service handles CUI, verify the applicable FedRAMP Moderate authorization or equivalency requirements and contractual obligations; the brand name alone does not establish them | Confirm your tenant is inside the offering and which features it covers |
| Your MSP runs Tenable for you | The MSP's tools and/or Tenable's cloud | The MSP’s services handling your SPD are relevant ESP services in scope. Managing a third-party cloud for you does not by itself make the MSP a CSP. | SSP entry, the MSP's CRM, and your own access to the reports |
| Your CUI lives in a hosted enclave | The enclave provider | A genuinely separated enclave can reduce scope, but connected endpoints, security assets, and relevant provider services may still be included | The actual boundary, connections, provider responsibilities, and evidence for any claimed inheritance |
| You do not know where results or exports go | Unknown | Unknown is not “no CUI,” “out of scope,” or an approved deployment | Resolve tenant, data flows, exports, support access, and integrations before making a suitability decision |
The rules behind this table come from the Level 2 Scoping Guide (pages 5–11) and Table 4 of 32 CFR 170.19. For the full picture, see our guides to external service provider requirements, cloud service provider requirements, and CMMC scoping.
Quick check: Where do your scan results live — on a server in your building, in Tenable's cloud, or in your MSP's tools? Write that answer into your SSP.
Can Tenable scan results contain CUI?
Scan results about in-scope assets are Security Protection Data; that label does not rule out CUI also being present. One route to check is Tenable’s file-contents audits. Tenable offers “Windows File Contents” and “Unix File Contents” compliance checks that look inside files (Nessus docs). Review actual scan output, exports, integrations, and support files—not just that feature—before sending data to a service not approved for CUI. Sensitivity alone also does not make information CUI. 32 CFR 170.4.
Is Tenable FedRAMP authorized?
One Tenable offering is. The FedRAMP Marketplace lists "Tenable Government Solutions," from Tenable Public Sector, as FedRAMP Certified. The listing shows Rev5, agency path, Class C (Moderate), certified since September 22, 2021. We checked it on September 23, 2026.
That listing covers one offering, not every Tenable subscription. Tenable's main product login is cloud.tenable.com. Ask your Tenable rep in writing whether your tenant is part of the FedRAMP offering.
Tenable's own FedRAMP product-offering document, last revised June 25, 2026, splits features into three groups:
| Tenable's grouping (company-stated) | Examples |
|---|---|
| Supported in the platform and authorized | Vulnerability Management, Web App Scanning, Exposure Management, Cloud Security, Nessus scanners, Tenable Agent, OT Security |
| Supported in the platform but not authorized | Sensor Proxy, Identity Exposure On-Premises |
| Neither supported nor authorized | Hexa AI, Identity Exposure SaaS, MSSP Portal, Vulnerability Management Cloud Connectors, Lumin, PCI ASV |
These are selected product-group examples, not approval of every feature or integration. The document qualifies several product entries; verify the exact tenant and enabled features against its full table.
Remember the MSSP Portal line if an MSP runs your Tenable. It matters only if you need the FedRAMP environment.
If you now know where your scan data lives, the next question is who should run it. You could keep it in-house, hand defined work to an MSP, or use a CUI enclave with scanning responsibilities documented in the service agreement. That's a path decision, not a Tenable setting.
Which Tenable product fits a defense contractor?
Pick by where your CUI lives and who will run the scans, not by feature list.
- Nessus Professional runs scans and configuration audits from a single scanner.
- Tenable Vulnerability Management adds cloud management and agents.
- Security Center provides on-premises management; your deployment, integrations, and exports determine where the data actually goes.
Prices below are the dollar amounts displayed on Tenable’s purchase page on September 23, 2026, not a quote for your deployment. The page showed conflicting amounts for its two cloud products, so those rows do not present a settled price. We did not complete checkout or verify customer-specific taxes, entitlements, multi-year terms, or reseller pricing.
| Product | Where it runs | 800-171 help Tenable documents | Displayed one-year price | Good fit when | Watch for |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Nessus Essentials / Essentials Plus | Your computer | None for configuration audits (not available in these editions) | — | Learning and lab work | Can't run the audits behind 3.4.2 |
| Nessus Professional | A scanner you install | Compliance audits with audit files; raw JSON exports | $4,790 | You have staff to configure scans and assemble evidence | Remote targets must be reachable during scanning; do not assume an agent-management service is included |
| Nessus Expert | A scanner you install | Professional’s scanning capabilities plus the web-application and external-attack-surface features described on the purchase page | $6,790 | You need what Professional does, plus the extras Tenable lists | Confirm the extras you'd actually use |
| Tenable Vulnerability Management (sold as "Tenable One Vulnerability Management") | Tenable's cloud | 800-171 Audit Summary dashboard and Audit Details report | Conflicting page amounts: $3,700 / $3,500 for 100 assets; see note below | Several sites, or laptops that travel (agents) | Scan data sits in Tenable's cloud, so it needs SSP and CRM entries |
| Tenable Web App Scanning | Tenable's cloud | Web-application findings that may support objectives [c] and [e] | Conflicting page amounts: $6,790 / $3,578 for 5 fully qualified domain names; see note below | You run web applications in scope | Does not establish all custom-application coverage; choose additional techniques where needed |
| Tenable Security Center | Your own servers | NIST SP 800-171 report template; Risk Assessment report card | Custom quote on the purchase page | You need on-premises management | You run and patch it, and it's in scope |
| Tenable Government Solutions (FedRAMP) | Tenable's FedRAMP environment | Per Tenable's product-offering document | Ask Tenable | CUI enters the cloud service, or the applicable contract requires this offering | Not every feature is inside the authorization |
The cloud-price discrepancy matters. The main purchase panels displayed $3,700 for Vulnerability Management and $6,790 for Web App Scanning; embedded purchase forms displayed $3,500 and $3,578 for the corresponding 100-asset and 5-domain selections. These are conflicting displays, not a market-price range or an offer we verified at checkout. Confirm the final product, term, quantity, and amount before budgeting or paying. The Nessus Professional and Expert displays agreed at $4,790 and $6,790 for one year. Tenable purchase page.
A software subscription is only one cost. Keep implementation, recurring operation/remediation work, and any separate assessment engagement outside the license figure rather than presenting the subscription as your full compliance budget.
Three naming traps:
- Tenable Enclave Security isn't a CUI enclave. In an April 2025 release, Tenable described it as built for classified or otherwise air-gapped environments.
- Tenable Patch Management is a separate product that could help with the "correct" part of 3.14.1. We didn't evaluate it.
- Old names still show up in Tenable's resources. Tenable.io is now Vulnerability Management, and Tenable.sc is now Security Center.
Tenable at a glance
What it is. Tenable is a cybersecurity software company. It sells vulnerability and exposure management products.
What this purchase is not. A scanning subscription is not readiness consulting, a managed security service, a GRC implementation, or a formal assessment by a C3PAO (CMMC Third-Party Assessment Organization). Its software produces evidence; buying it does not assess or certify your company. We found no DoD-score calculation or SPRS-submission feature in the Tenable documentation reviewed for this guide. SPRS is the Supplier Performance Risk System. Tenable documentation; CMMC Level 2 self-assessment requirements.
What Tenable says about itself. Tenable's NIST SP 800-171 solution page says Security Center automates monitoring and assessment of many of the 800-171 technical controls. The tables above show selected evidence examples and the work those examples leave to you; they are not an exhaustive vendor capability inventory.
What to verify before you buy or renew:
- Which audit files cover your actual systems, and whether their checks carry 800-171 tags.
- Whether your tenant is commercial or part of the FedRAMP offering.
- Whether Tenable will give you a customer responsibility matrix for your SSP.
- How you'll export and retain the artifacts used in an assessment for the required six years, while setting an appropriate operational retention policy for other scan records.
- Whether agents can reach every laptop.
- The price for your real asset count.
Who it fits: Teams with someone to run it and act on what it finds, MSPs, and environments that need configuration audits.
Who it doesn't fit:
- A shop with no one to act on findings.
- A company buying it solely because it mistakenly believes FCI-only Level 1 work requires a 110-requirement evidence package. A scanner may still have operational value.
- A company buying duplicate coverage without checking what its enclave provider already scans and which responsibilities remain with the company.
Alternatives, by category (not ranked):
- other commercial vulnerability scanners
- open-source scanners
- scanning run as a service by an MSP or MSSP
- scanning included with a CUI enclave
Our vulnerability scanning guide compares these by what they can prove. Our CMMC software guide covers the wider tool stack.
How do you build a Tenable evidence package an assessor can follow?
Start from the requirement, not the report title. Decide what you’re trying to prove, run the checks that support it, keep the raw results, and write down what they don’t cover. Assessment evidence must be in final form (32 CFR 170.24(b)). The artifacts used in an assessment must be retained for six years from the applicable CMMC Status Date: 170.15(c)(2) for Level 1 and 170.16(c)(4) for Level 2 self-assessments. That is not a blanket six-year rule for every operational scan you ever run. Level 2 certification assessments have additional artifact-hashing provisions in 170.17(c)(4).
| Step | Requirement it supports | Tenable feature | Artifact to keep |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1. Match your inventory to the scanner's targets | 3.11.2 [b], 3.4.1 | Target lists; asset discovery | A dated inventory showing every in-scope system and whether it's covered |
| 2. Write down your frequency and trigger | 3.11.2 [a], [d], [e] | Scan schedules | Your defined frequency for systems and applications, no longer than one year, plus the response to newly identified vulnerabilities affecting them |
| 3. Verify authenticated or supported local execution | 3.11.2, 3.14.1 | Credentialed scan policies or supported agent scans | The scan configuration and successful execution/authentication status (never the passwords) |
| 4. Pick and adopt a benchmark | 3.4.2 | CIS or DISA STIG audit files | An SSP entry naming the benchmark, its version, and your approved exceptions; a note on any custom or gold-image changes |
| 5. Export the raw results | 3.4.2 and the supporting rows | Compliance Export JSON (plugin 174790), or XCCDF (plugin 174792, DISA STIG audits only) | One results file per machine and audit |
| 6. Track fixes to closure | 3.11.3, 3.14.1 | Findings and re-scans | Tickets, risk decisions, and the re-scan showing each fix |
| 7. Preserve the assessment artifacts | Retention rule | Your exports | A dated archive of artifacts used in the assessment, retained for six years from the applicable CMMC Status Date |
| 8. Put Tenable itself in your SSP | Scope | — | Asset inventory entry, SSP entry, and a CRM if it's cloud-hosted or MSP-run |
In step 4, CIS means the Center for Internet Security. DISA STIG means the Defense Information Systems Agency's Security Technical Implementation Guides. CIS publishes benchmarks; DISA publishes STIGs. Both provide hardening checklists. Choose the applicable profile and record exceptions; the benchmark’s settings do not become CMMC requirements merely because the names appear together.
Turning on the JSON export. Tenable's export documentation says the export is off by default. To turn it on:
- Open the Policy Compliance Auditing template.
- Go to Settings → Advanced, and set the scan type to Custom.
- Under General → Compliance Output Settings, choose "Generate JSON result file."
Each file records the audit, the machine, the scan start and stop times, and each check's result. It also records the value found, the value expected, and the benchmark name and version. That's the raw record another reviewer can trace. To retrieve it, open the completed scan’s vulnerability results, select Compliance Export JSON (plugin 174790), and use its file attachments. It covers configuration audits only; keep your vulnerability-scan history separately.
Use this worksheet to tie each result to what it proves. Copy it, fill it in inside your own approved systems, and keep it with the export. It's a plain template. Nothing on this page collects it.
Here's the worksheet filled in for the fictional machine shop above:
Reusable worksheet
Use this worksheet to tie each result to what it proves
Copy it, fill it in inside your own approved systems, and keep it with the export. It is a plain template. Nothing on this page collects it.
Blank worksheet
TENABLE EVIDENCE WORKSHEET Purpose: organize supporting evidence. This worksheet does not calculate a score. Requirement and objective (e.g., 3.11.2[b]): Standard: NIST SP 800-171 Rev. 2 / NIST SP 800-171A (June 2018) Assessment scope and inventory version: Tenable product, and where results are stored: Scan type (vulnerability / configuration audit / web application): Execution/authentication (remote success / remote failed / partial / local agent / unknown): Audit file name, version, and profile: Custom or gold-image changes, and who approved them: Systems or applications expected: Systems or applications successfully tested: Missing, failed, unsupported, or excluded — and why: Scan dates and time zone: Export file name and archive location: What this artifact supports: What it does not establish / other evidence still needed: Fix or risk-decision reference: Owner and target date: Re-scan reference: Reviewer and review date: Evidence state: NOT REVIEWED / MISSING / NEEDS REVIEW / COLLECTED COLLECTED means the artifact has been gathered. It does not mean MET. Unknown stays unknown. Never write passwords, keys, CUI, or drawings here. Editorial template, not a government form. Template checked September 23, 2026. Objectives source: https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-171A.pdf Export fields source: https://docs.tenable.com/nessus/compliance-checks-reference/Content/ComplianceDataExport.htm
Fictional example
Requirement and objective: NIST SP 800-171 Rev. 2, 3.11.2[b] Assessment scope and inventory version: Fictional shop, inventory v3 (22 systems) Tenable product, and where results are stored: Security Center, on-premises Scan type: Vulnerability scan, logged in Systems expected: 22 Systems successfully tested in the 14-day window: 16 Missing — and why: 4 detected but not scanned (scan window missed); 1 laptop never detected (off-site); 1 copier never detected (unreachable segment) What this artifact supports: coverage for 16 systems in this window What it doesn't prove: the 6 missing systems; objectives [a], [c], [d], [e] Owner and target date: IT lead; date to be set by the owner Evidence state: NEEDS REVIEW
How often does this evidence need to stay current? A CMMC Level 2 self-assessment is required every three years, with affirmation after an assessment—including a POA&M closeout—and annually afterward. Scanning still follows your defined frequency and relevant-new-vulnerability trigger, and required safeguards must remain implemented between affirmations. An archive is not a reason to stop reviewing current results. 32 CFR 170.16 and 170.22.
For evidence that goes beyond Tenable, see what CMMC assessment evidence looks like. Our guides to patch management, configuration management, and asset inventory cover the process side of steps 1, 4, and 6.
What can't Tenable cover, and who usually fills the gap?
The remaining 75 requirements still need explicit evidence plans. Their maximum deduction weights add to 200 of the method’s 313 possible deductions. Some may also have useful Tenable checks or integrations; they are not classified here as “no evidence.” The table shows the work and ownership that a scanner subscription does not replace. Requirement descriptions come from Revision 2; weights come from Annex A.
| Work to plan | Requirements | Maximum deductions | Usually handled by | Our guide |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Access and identity | 3.1.1–3.1.4, 3.1.6, 3.5.1–3.5.6, 3.5.9, 3.5.11 | 33 | Your identity system and MSP; multifactor authentication | MFA, passwords, privileged access |
| Remote, wireless, mobile, and external systems | 3.1.12, 3.1.14–3.1.22 | 28 | MSP; mobile device management | Remote work, wireless, mobile devices |
| Network design and boundary | 3.13.1–3.13.7, 3.13.10, 3.13.12–3.13.14 | 27 | MSP or network engineer | Segmentation, FIPS encryption |
| Logging and monitoring | 3.3.2–3.3.6, 3.14.6, 3.14.7 | 19 | Security information and event management (SIEM), managed detection and response (MDR), or an MSSP | SIEM, MDR |
| Malware scanning | 3.14.5 | 3 | Antivirus or EDR | EDR |
| Change control | 3.4.3–3.4.5 | 7 | Your change process | Configuration management |
| Plans and the SSP | 3.12.2, 3.12.4 | 3, plus the SSP prerequisite (no numerical deduction assigned) | GRC platform or RPO/RP | SSP template, POA&M template, GRC software |
| People | 3.2.1–3.2.3, 3.9.1, 3.9.2 | 19 | HR and training | Training, personnel security |
| Incident response | 3.6.1–3.6.3 | 11 | Your plan, often with an MSSP | Incident response plan |
| Maintenance | 3.7.1–3.7.6 | 18 | IT procedures and your MSP | Maintenance |
| Media | 3.8.1–3.8.6, 3.8.8–3.8.9 | 18 | Procedures and device controls | Media protection, removable media |
| Physical | 3.10.1–3.10.6 | 14 | Facilities | Physical security |
See the individual weights for the other 75 requirements
These short descriptions are a navigation aid, not the full requirement or its assessment objectives. Read them with the evidence-owner table above. “Other” means not mapped to an example in this guide; it does not mean Tenable could never supply supporting evidence.
Requirements: NIST SP 800-171 Revision 2. Objectives: NIST SP 800-171A, June 2018. Deduction weights: DoD Assessment Methodology, Annex A and 32 CFR 170.24. Checked September 23, 2026.
| Requirement | Work that still needs an evidence plan | Deduction if not met |
|---|---|---|
| 3.1.1 | Limit system access to authorized users, processes, and devices | 5 |
| 3.1.2 | Limit users to authorized transactions and functions | 5 |
| 3.1.3 | Control CUI flows according to approved authorizations | 1 |
| 3.1.4 | Separate duties to reduce misuse without collusion | 1 |
| 3.1.6 | Use nonprivileged accounts for nonsecurity functions | 1 |
| 3.1.12 | Monitor and control remote-access sessions | 5 |
| 3.1.14 | Route remote access through managed access points | 1 |
| 3.1.15 | Authorize remote privileged commands and access to security-relevant information | 1 |
| 3.1.16 | Authorize wireless access before allowing connections | 5 |
| 3.1.17 | Protect wireless access with authentication and encryption | 5 |
| 3.1.18 | Control mobile-device connections | 5 |
| 3.1.19 | Encrypt CUI on mobile devices and mobile computing platforms | 3 |
| 3.1.20 | Verify and control external-system connections and use | 1 |
| 3.1.21 | Limit organizational portable-storage use on external systems | 1 |
| 3.1.22 | Control CUI on publicly accessible systems | 1 |
| 3.2.1 | Make managers, administrators, and users aware of security risks and policies | 5 |
| 3.2.2 | Train personnel for their assigned security duties | 5 |
| 3.2.3 | Train personnel to recognize and report possible insider threats | 1 |
| 3.3.2 | Trace system actions uniquely to individual users | 3 |
| 3.3.3 | Review and update logged events | 1 |
| 3.3.4 | Alert on audit-logging failures | 1 |
| 3.3.5 | Correlate audit-review, analysis, and reporting processes | 5 |
| 3.3.6 | Provide audit reduction and report generation | 1 |
| 3.4.3 | Track, review, approve or disapprove, and log system changes | 1 |
| 3.4.4 | Analyze security impacts before implementing changes | 1 |
| 3.4.5 | Define and enforce access restrictions for system changes | 5 |
| 3.5.1 | Identify users, processes, and devices | 5 |
| 3.5.2 | Authenticate identities before allowing access | 5 |
| 3.5.3 | Use multifactor authentication for the required privileged and nonprivileged access | 3–5 |
| 3.5.4 | Use replay-resistant network authentication | 1 |
| 3.5.5 | Prevent identifier reuse for the defined period | 1 |
| 3.5.6 | Disable identifiers after defined inactivity | 1 |
| 3.5.9 | Require an immediate permanent-password change after a temporary password | 1 |
| 3.5.11 | Obscure authentication feedback | 1 |
| 3.6.1 | Establish incident handling covering preparation through recovery | 5 |
| 3.6.2 | Track, document, and report incidents to designated officials or authorities | 5 |
| 3.6.3 | Test the incident-response capability | 1 |
| 3.7.1 | Perform system maintenance | 3 |
| 3.7.2 | Control maintenance tools, techniques, mechanisms, and personnel | 5 |
| 3.7.3 | Remove CUI from equipment before off-site maintenance | 1 |
| 3.7.4 | Check diagnostic and test media for malicious code | 3 |
| 3.7.5 | Use multifactor authentication for nonlocal maintenance and terminate connections afterward | 5 |
| 3.7.6 | Supervise maintenance personnel without required authorization | 1 |
| 3.8.1 | Physically control and securely store media containing CUI | 3 |
| 3.8.2 | Limit CUI media access to authorized users | 3 |
| 3.8.3 | Sanitize or destroy CUI media before disposal or reuse | 5 |
| 3.8.4 | Mark media with required CUI and distribution markings | 1 |
| 3.8.5 | Control and account for CUI media during transport | 1 |
| 3.8.6 | Protect digital CUI during transport cryptographically unless alternative physical safeguards apply | 1 |
| 3.8.8 | Prohibit portable storage without an identifiable owner | 3 |
| 3.8.9 | Protect backup CUI confidentiality at storage locations | 1 |
| 3.9.1 | Screen individuals before authorizing system access | 3 |
| 3.9.2 | Protect systems during and after personnel transfers and terminations | 5 |
| 3.10.1 | Limit physical access to authorized individuals | 5 |
| 3.10.2 | Protect and monitor facilities and supporting infrastructure | 5 |
| 3.10.3 | Escort visitors and monitor their activity | 1 |
| 3.10.4 | Maintain physical-access logs | 1 |
| 3.10.5 | Control and manage physical-access devices | 1 |
| 3.10.6 | Apply CUI safeguards at alternate work sites | 1 |
| 3.12.2 | Develop and implement plans to correct deficiencies and vulnerabilities | 3 |
| 3.12.4 | Develop, document, and periodically update the system security plan | Prerequisite — no score without adequate SSP |
| 3.13.1 | Monitor, control, and protect communications at external and key internal boundaries | 5 |
| 3.13.2 | Use security-supporting architecture, development, and engineering principles | 5 |
| 3.13.3 | Separate user functionality from system-management functionality | 1 |
| 3.13.4 | Prevent unintended information transfer through shared resources | 1 |
| 3.13.5 | Separate public-facing components from internal networks | 5 |
| 3.13.6 | Deny network traffic by default and allow by exception | 5 |
| 3.13.7 | Prevent remote devices from simultaneous unauthorized external connections | 1 |
| 3.13.10 | Establish and manage cryptographic keys | 1 |
| 3.13.12 | Prohibit remote activation of collaborative devices and indicate their use | 1 |
| 3.13.13 | Control and monitor mobile code | 1 |
| 3.13.14 | Control and monitor voice-over-IP technologies | 1 |
| 3.14.5 | Perform periodic malware scans and real-time scans of external files | 3 |
| 3.14.6 | Monitor systems and traffic for attacks or indicators of attack | 5 |
| 3.14.7 | Identify unauthorized system use | 3 |
Three notes on this table:
- The SSP is the one to start with. Without an up-to-date SSP, an assessment can't be completed at all (32 CFR Part 170, Subpart D). It's also on the rule's list of requirements that can never go on a POA&M.
- 3.14.5 isn't your Nessus scan. It calls for "periodic scans of organizational systems and real-time scans of files from external sources." That's the job of your antivirus or EDR, not a vulnerability scanner.
- Deciding who owns each row is its own exercise. Our shared responsibility matrix guide walks through it.
If most of your open items sit in the policy, people, logging, or SSP rows, a bigger scanner license won't close them. A different kind of help will.
Frequently asked questions
Can a Tenable pass percentage become my SPRS score?
No. Your score in the Supplier Performance Risk System (SPRS) comes from assessing all 110 requirements under the applicable DoD method, one requirement at a time. A Tenable pass rate counts checks or references, not completed requirements. Keep Tenable’s output as supporting evidence, and do not confuse a NIST assessment score posting with a CMMC status and affirmation. 32 CFR 170.16 and 170.24. See how SPRS scoring works.
Does a CIS Level 2 benchmark mean CMMC Level 2?
No. The two uses of "Level 2" are a coincidence. A CIS benchmark's Level 1 and Level 2 profiles describe how strict the hardening is. CMMC Level 2 is a program level tied to NIST SP 800-171 Revision 2 (32 CFR 170.14). Pick the benchmark that fits each system, then check the evidence against the actual requirements. Tenable benchmark-profile documentation.
Can every vulnerability ticket go on a CMMC POA&M?
No. The rule separates an assessment POA&M from an everyday "operational plan of action," which tracks patches and fixes as threats change (32 CFR 170.4). An assessment POA&M can list only eligible unmet requirements and must close within 180 days of the Conditional CMMC Status Date. Operational patching and newly discovered deficiencies belong in the operational plan; calling an unimplemented requirement a patch ticket does not make it MET. 32 CFR 170.21; 170.24.
Does an empty or missing result mean a requirement doesn't apply?
No. An empty filter only means no tagged results came back. A requirement is “not applicable” only when the determination has a valid, documented basis, not when a report chapter is blank. 32 CFR 170.24(b).
Are Tenable's "CMMC" reports current?
Some aren't. Tenable's Security Center "CMMC Operations Report" (October 2020) describes five CMMC levels. The program now has three. Use the current applicable audit content, identify its revision, and connect the evidence to Revision 2 requirements; an 800-171 label alone does not establish current compatibility. Tenable’s legacy report; current CMMC baseline.
If our MSP runs Tenable, does that count as our evidence?
It can. Where the MSP processes, stores, or transmits your Security Protection Data on its assets, its relevant services are in scope—not its entire business. Document those services and responsibilities in your SSP and the customer responsibility matrix, and make sure you can obtain the evidence. Level 2 Scoping Guide. Our guide to CMMC requirements for MSPs covers the rest.
Is Tenable "CMMC certified"?
No tool is. CMMC statuses belong to a contractor's information system, recorded in SPRS after an assessment (32 CFR 170.4). A scanner can help you prove parts of your program. It can't hold a CMMC status.
What we verified — and what this page doesn't test
Checked September 23, 2026:
- The Department’s CMMC pages, the July 13 implementation memorandum, the deviation index, and the complete September 3 Revision 3 deviation memorandum and attachments.
- The relevant sections of 32 CFR Part 170, including assessment criteria, POA&Ms, scoping, affirmation, and assessment-artifact retention.
- NIST SP 800-171 Revision 2 and the June 2018 NIST SP 800-171A assessment objectives.
- The DoD Level 2 Scoping Guide (v2.13).
- The point weights in Annex A of the official DoD NIST SP 800-171 Assessment Methodology (v1.2.1), and the table arithmetic.
- The FedRAMP Marketplace listing for Tenable Government Solutions and Tenable’s product-offering document, revised June 25, 2026.
- Tenable’s Nessus compliance and export documentation, compliance-framework documentation, and the vendor examples linked in the evidence tables.
- Tenable’s 800-171 report, dashboard, and report-card pages.
- Tenable’s displayed purchase-page prices, including the conflicting cloud-product amounts described above.
What we didn’t do:
- We didn’t run Tenable in a lab, execute the linked checks, or test a customer’s deployment.
- We didn’t inspect the nonpublic FedRAMP package, confirm a customer’s tenant or entitlements, or verify checkout pricing and taxes.
- We didn’t complete the Find My CMMC Path questionnaire.
The evidence grouping and machine-shop example are our own analysis. The mapped examples are not an exhaustive capability inventory or an official compliance determination.
Our methodology explains how we source and update pages. Our editorial and advertising policy explains how we handle commercial relationships.
Still not sure which CMMC path fits your company? Use The Defense Compliance Report's Find My CMMC Path tool to see which path and kind of help fit your contract, CUI, environment, and timeline — before you hire anyone.
Sources
Government sources
- Department of War CIO, About CMMC and CMMC program page — checked September 23, 2026.
- Implementing the Suspension of CMMC Phase II, July 13, 2026; Class Deviation 2026-O0025 Revision 3, September 3, 2026, including its attachments; official deviation index — checked September 23, 2026.
- 32 CFR Part 170, particularly §§170.4, 170.14–170.17, 170.19, 170.21, 170.22, and 170.24 — checked September 23, 2026.
- DoD CIO, CMMC Scoping Guide — Level 2, v2.13 — checked September 23, 2026.
- NIST SP 800-171 DoD Assessment Methodology, v1.2.1, Annex A, June 24, 2020 — official text read and weights checked September 23, 2026.
- NIST, SP 800-171 Revision 2 and SP 800-171A, June 2018 — checked September 23, 2026. Their archive/supersession status does not by itself change the revision incorporated for CMMC.
- DFARS 252.204-7012 — read with the current deviation and the clause actually incorporated into the contract, not as a replacement for contract-specific analysis.
- FedRAMP Marketplace, Tenable Government Solutions, FR1814276801 — checked September 23, 2026.
Tenable sources (company-stated)
- FedRAMP Product Offering, revised June 25, 2026 — table and column groupings visually checked September 23, 2026.
- Nessus Compliance documentation and Compliance Data Export Plugins — checked September 23, 2026.
- Compliance Frameworks and agent-scan documentation — checked September 23, 2026; verify the documentation for your deployed release.
- 800-171 Audit Details report, 800-171 Audit Summary dashboard, NIST SP 800-171 report template, Risk Assessment report card, and CMMC Operations Report — checked September 23, 2026. Legacy program descriptions and template dependencies are not current CMMC requirements.
- NIST SP 800-171 solution page and April 2, 2025 FedRAMP press release — checked September 23, 2026.
- The audit items, plugins, and report examples linked beside the 35 mapped requirements — checked September 23, 2026. A configuration example is not proof that all objectives are met or that the same check is available in every edition.
- Tenable purchase page — displayed prices and discrepancies checked September 23, 2026; checkout, taxes, reseller terms, and customer-specific quotes not verified.
About The Defense Compliance Report
The Defense Compliance Report is the independent trade publication and decision resource for CMMC and Defense Industrial Base compliance — explaining the CMMC Final Rule with primary-source citation on every claim and mapping a contractor's level, CUI scope, assessment type, and timeline to the right provider category, so DIB contractors choose the right CMMC path before they spend six figures.
We're not affiliated with the Cyber AB, the Department of Defense, the Defense Contract Management Agency's Defense Industrial Base Cybersecurity Assessment Center (DCMA DIBCAC), NIST, or any U.S. government agency. This page is educational research, not legal, contractual, or compliance advice. Confirm scope and applicability with a CMMC Registered Practitioner (RP) or a qualified federal-contracts attorney.